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 The Utah Attorney General submits this brief defending the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601 (“the undertaking 
statute”).  See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-403(3); Utah R. Civ. P. 
24(d)(1).  The Attorney General also submitted a brief in the trial court.1   
BACKGROUND 
 The undertaking statute provides: 
§ 63G-7-601.  Actions governed by Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure--Undertaking Required 
 
    (1) An action brought under this chapter shall be 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent 
that they are consistent with this chapter. 
    (2) At the time the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an 
undertaking in a sum fixed by the court that is: 
 (a) not less than $300; and 
 (b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable 
costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover 
judgment. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601. 
 
 This unremarkable statute, which is part of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-7-101, et seq.),  
                                      
 1 The State of Utah’s Position Regarding the Constitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601.  (R. 436-447). 
 
2 
 
requires only that a plaintiff bringing an action against a Utah 
governmental entity file an undertaking of at least $300 when the action 
is filed.2, 3  The express purpose of the undertaking is to assure that, “if 
the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment,” the 
“taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action” will be 
                                      
 2  Although the statute provides that the amount of the 
undertaking can be “fixed by the court,” in practice it is the experience of 
the Attorney General’s Office that an amount greater than $300 is 
seldom, if ever, sought.   
 
 3  The U.S. District Court in Utah has adopted a local rule, Rule 
DUCivR 67-1(c), which addresses the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-7-601: 
 
 FED. R. CIV. P. 67 - DEPOSIT IN COURT 
 DUCivR 67-1 RECEIPT AND DEPOSIT OF REGISTRY 
FUNDS 
    … 
    (c) Deposit of Required Undertaking or Bond in 
Civil Actions. 
   In any case involving a civil action against the State of 
Utah, its officers, or its governmental entities, for which the 
filing of a written undertaking or cost bond is required by 
state law as a condition of proceeding with such an action, 
the clerk of court may accept an undertaking or bond at the 
time the complaint is filed in an amount not less than 
$300.00.  The court may review, fix, and adjust the amount 
of the required undertaking or bond as provided by law.  
The court may dismiss without prejudice any applicable case 
in which the required undertaking or bond is not timely filed. 
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paid.  Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601.  The “costs incurred by the 
governmental entity” in this context and for which the legislature has 
provided protection are, of course, public funds.  If the plaintiff prevails, 
or even if the plaintiff loses but pays the taxable costs, the $300 would be 
refundable.  In other words, unlike a filing fee that is not refundable, if 
a plaintiff simply fulfills his wholly reasonable responsibility of paying 
taxable costs, he gets his $300 back.  The statute also expressly provides 
that actions subject to the $300 undertaking requirement are governed 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rules designed to provide due 
process protections to litigants.  Id. 
 The undertaking statute is in many ways similar to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(j), which provides: 
RULE 12.  DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
* * * * 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff.  When 
the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a 
foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to 
require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff.  Upon hearing 
and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity 
therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 
undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment 
of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such 
plaintiff.  No security shall be required of any officer, 
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instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(j).  The Utah Supreme Court has held that the same 
policy—“discouraging nuisance suits”— supports both the undertaking 
statute (Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601) and the Rule 12(j) cost bond 
requirement for non-resident plaintiffs.  Hansen v. Salt Lake Cnty., 794 
P.2d 838, 840 (Utah 1990). 
 The Governmental Immunity Act has included this same 
undertaking requirement from the very beginning.  See 1965 Utah 
Laws 390, 393-94.  And, remarkably, the minimum amount 
due—$300—has remained the same for the past 50 years.  Id.  
Whatever burden a $300 undertaking may have imposed in 1965, the 
requirement now presents no more than a speed bump on an individual’s 
way to filing a lawsuit against the government.   
The undertaking statute is constitutional and withstands Kendall’s 
claims. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 A trial court’s determinations of the legal requirements for 
standing are reviewed for correctness.  Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ¶ 
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10, 154 P.3d 808.  A challenged statute is presumed to be constitutional 
and any reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.  
Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 295.  
Plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of 
constitutionality.  Further, since he is “willing” and “able” to file the 
$300 undertaking, his challenge should be treated as a facial 
constitutional challenge, which requires him to “establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.”  State v. 
Herrera, 1999 UT 64, n.2, 993 P.2d 854 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Gillmor v. Summit Cnty., 2010 UT 69, 
¶ 27, 246 P.3d 102 (“in asserting a facial challenge, [a] party avers that 
the statute is so constitutionally flawed that no set of circumstances 
exists under which the [statute] would be valid”). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Because Appellant Kendall Lacks Standing, This Court 
Should Not Reach the Question of the Constitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601. 
 
 Surprisingly, given the challenge he asserts, Appellant Kendall 
does not claim he cannot afford to file, or that he refuses to file, the 
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(potentially refundable) $300 undertaking:  “I am willing and able to 
post $300 to satisfy the cost undertaking statute, if that is the amount 
set by the Court.”4  Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation does not seek 
“an undertaking of more than $300.”5  And, the trial court, in fact, set 
the undertaking amount at $300.6  Given those undisputed facts, 
Kendall lacks standing to challenge the undertaking statute.  “[A] 
challenge to standing is jurisdictional and may be brought at any stage of 
the litigation.”  Brown v. Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14, ¶ 15, 228 
P.3d 747. 
 In Hoyle v. Monson,7 the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The right and power of the judiciary to declare whether 
legislative enactments exceed constitutional limitations is to 
be exercised with considerable restraint and in conformity 
with fundamental rules.  One such fundamental rule of 
                                      
 4  Revised Affidavit of Sean Kendall at 8, ¶ 43.  (R. 496). 
 
 5  Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 17.  (R. 339). 
 
 6  “Plaintiff is required to file an undertaking in an amount of 
$300.”  Order at 2.  (R. 581). 
 
 7  606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980).  Interestingly, Hoyle was also 
litigated by Appellant’s counsel in this case. 
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long-standing is that unnecessary decisions are to be avoided 
and that the courts should pass upon the constitutionality of 
a statute only when such a determination is essential to the 
decision in a case.  A constitutional question does not arise 
merely because it is raised and a decision is sought thereon; 
rather, the constitutionality of a statute is to be considered in 
the light of the standing of the one who seeks to raise the 
question and of its particular application.  An attack on the 
validity of a statute cannot be made by parties whose interests 
have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced by the 
operation of the statute. 
 
Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
 
 In Hoyle, the Court was faced with a challenge that turned on the 
ability of the plaintiffs to pay a statutorily required amount.8  Because 
the plaintiffs were, in fact, able to pay, the Utah Supreme Court held “it 
was not necessary for the trial court nor is it now necessary for this Court 
to reach the question as to the constitutionality of the filing fee provision, 
for the plaintiffs lack standing.”  Id. at 242. 
 The same is true here.  Appellant does not have standing to 
challenge the undertaking statute and this Court should not reach the 
question of the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 67G-7-601.   
                                      
 8  In Hoyle, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a 
statute requiring payment of a filing fee to become a candidate for office.  
Id. at 241. 
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II. The Undertaking Statute Does Not Violate Equal 
Protection. 
  
Though stated differently, both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions 
“incorporate the [b]asic principles of equal protection.”  Gallivan v. 
Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 32, 54 P.3d 1069 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  While sharing fundamental principles, Utah’s uniform 
operation of laws provision may at times be more rigorous than its 
federal equal protection counterpart.  Id. at ¶ 33.  Thus, if the 
undertaking statute satisfies the uniform operation of law provision, it 
necessarily passes muster under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 This case does not present a situation where Kendall is denied 
access to the courts by operation of the undertaking statute.  Here, 
Kendall does not claim that he is either unable or unwilling to pay the 
$300 undertaking.  Kendall has averred that he is “willing and able to 
post $300 to satisfy the cost undertaking statute.”9  The question in this 
case is whether the undertaking requirement violates the equal 
protection rights of persons who are able and willing to pay the 
                                      
 9  Revised Affidavit of Sean Kendall at 8, ¶ 43.  (R. 496). 
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undertaking.10  Because the undertaking statute does not implicate 
either a suspect class or a fundamental right and does not seriously 
impede access to the courts, heightened scrutiny analysis is not 
warranted.  Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 40; Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 
¶ 19, 103 P.3d 135. 
 Under rational basis review, “any rational or ‘reasonable’ basis for 
legislative classification is sufficient, meaning that any ‘legitimate’ 
governmental objective suffices, and any ‘reasonable relationship’ 
between classification and purpose is adequate.”  DIRECTV v. Utah 
State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 93, ¶ 51, 364 P.2d 1036 (quoting Merrill v. 
Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 1089).   
Here, the undertaking statute, serves at least two legitimate 
government interests:  (1) discouraging nuisance suits against 
governmental entities, and (2) assuring that at least some minimal 
amount of taxable costs incurred by the government will be paid.  The 
Utah Supreme Court has already recognized the relationship between 
                                      
 10  Kendall makes no argument, and there is none, that the 
undertaking statute does not operate equally on all similarly situated 
persons (e.g., only some people who sue the government must file an 
undertaking while other government claimants need not do so). 
10 
 
the undertaking requirement and discouraging nuisance suits.  Hansen, 
794 P.2d at 840 (“The policy of discouraging nuisance suits . . . supports 
the undertaking requirement”).  And, the relationship between the 
undertaking requirement and assuring payment of taxable costs is 
self-evident.11   
 With the exception of only one case, the cases Kendall cites do not 
address the issue of protecting public funds by requiring an undertaking 
for taxable costs in suits against a government entity.  See Appellant’s 
Brief at 22-28.  The cases are inapposite.  Detraz v. Fontana,12 a 
Louisiana case, dealt with a statute requiring a bond for attorney fees, 
not costs, and a trial court order to post an attorney fee bond in the 
amount of $15,000.  Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc.,13 an Alaska case, 
dealt with a statute requiring an out-of-state plaintiff to post a bond for 
                                      
 11  Even under a heightened scrutiny review, the undertaking 
statute is reasonable, and it substantially furthers and is reasonably 
necessary to the legislative goals of protecting public funds.  See Judd, 
2004 UT 91 (discussing and applying heightened scrutiny in the context 
of a medical malpractice statutory damages cap). 
 
 12  416 So.2d 1291 (La. 1982). 
 
 13  765 P.2d 1375 (Alaska 1988). 
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costs and attorney fees, and a trial court order to post bond in the amount 
of $5,000.  Lindsey v. Normet14 dealt with an Oregon wrongful detainer 
statute that required a losing tenant to post a bond on appeal, not for 
costs, from an adverse decision in twice the amount of the rent expected 
to accrue pending an appellate decision.  There, the United States 
Supreme Court found the subject statute unconstitutional because it was 
“unrelated to actual rent accrued or to specific damage sustained by the 
landlord.”  Id. at 77.  Eastin v. Broomfield,15 an Arizona case, dealt 
with a medical malpractice act statute requiring a $2,000 bond for costs, 
and attorney fees, to be posted before filing suit by the non-prevailing 
party after medical panel review.   
 Only New v. Arizona Board of Regents,16 another Arizona case, 
dealt with a cost bond requirement in a suit against a state.  But even 
New is distinguishable.  There, Arizona’s $500 bond requirement was 
found by the Arizona Court of Appeals to not comply with the Arizona 
                                      
 14  405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
 
 15  570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977). 
 
 16  618 P.2d 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). 
 
12 
 
constitution’s “privileges and immunities” clause, a clause not found in 
and substantially different than any in the Utah Constitution.17  In 
New, disagreeing with the majority opinion, Presiding Judge Wren 
dissented and found dispositive the difference between a bond 
requirement in a suit between private parties and a bond requirement in 
a suit against a public entity and involving public funds.18   
The same distinction exists here.  Kendall’s claim is against public 
entities and involves public funds.  The undertaking is rationally 
related to legitimate state interests in discouraging frivolous suits and 
recouping costs incurred in defending against such suits, which is all the 
Constitution requires in this context.  See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 
                                      
 17  Arizona’s privileges and immunities clause states: 
 
§ 13. Equal privileges and immunities  
   Section 13.  No law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, 
class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges 
or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally 
belong to all citizens or corporations. 
 
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 13. 
 
 18  “[T]here is a substantial distinction between a non-waivable 
cost bond in medical malpractice litigation which involves only private 
parties and a suit against a public entity such as the Board of Regents 
which of necessity involves public funds.”  New, 618 P.2d at 240. 
13 
 
U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (emphasizing “the general rule” that “fee 
requirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality. . . . [and] [t]he 
State’s need for revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies 
the rationality requirement.”). 
III. The Undertaking Statute Does Not Violate Either the Open 
Courts or the Petition Clauses. 
 
 The Utah Supreme Court has observed that “[s]overeign 
immunity—the principle that the state cannot be sued in its own courts 
without its consent—was a well-settled principle of American common 
law at the time Utah became a state.”  Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 
627, 629 (Utah 1983).  And, “[b]efore the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act was passed in 1965, Utah adhered to the common law doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.”  Hansen, 794 P.2d at 842.  The Open Court’s 
Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 11, “worked no change in the 
principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is not 
unconstitutional under that section.”  Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629. 
 “Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution … was not meant to create 
a new remedy or a new right of action.”  Id.  The Utah Supreme Court 
14 
 
has held that the Open Courts Clause (Art. I, § 11) “applies only to 
legislation which ‘abrogates a cause of action existing at the time of its 
enactment.’”  Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at ¶ 17 (quoting Laney v. Fairview 
City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 50, 57 P.3d 1007).  “The legislature … remains free 
to abrogate or limit claims that could not have been brought under 
then-existing law.”  Id.  And, even abrogation of a legal remedy is 
acceptable if legislation “provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy” or seeks to eliminate “a clear social or 
economic evil” as long as it is not “an arbitrary or unreasonable means 
for achieving that objective.”  Id. at ¶ 18 (quoting Berry ex rel. Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985)). 
 Here, the undertaking statute abrogates no cause of action.  
Instead, the undertaking statute assures that taxable costs incurred will 
be paid and, as the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the undertaking 
statute furthers the policy of “discouraging nuisance suits.”  Hansen, 
794 P.2d at 840. 
  
 
15 
 
To prop up his Open Courts Clause argument, Kendall relies on the 
Florida case of Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel.19  See Appellant’s Brief 
at 34-35.  But this reliance is misplaced.  The statute at issue there 
was not part of Florida’s governmental immunity act, but instead 
Florida’s Legislature enacted it in response to “the growing medical 
malpractice crisis.”  Id. at 423.  Further, the statute required the 
posting of “bond sufficient to cover the defendant’s costs and attorney’s 
fees.”  Id. at 421 (emphasis added).  In fact, the bond required in the 
Psychiatric Associates case was $30,000—one hundred times the Utah 
undertaking requirement of $300.  Id. at 422.20   
 In contrast to the Florida statute, the Utah undertaking statute 
does not require an amount “sufficient to cover the defendant’s costs.”  
Nor does the Utah statute include any requirement for “attorney’s fees.”  
                                      
 19  610 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1992), receded from on other grounds in 
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Inc., 678 So.2d 
1239 (Fla. 1996). 
 
 20  Florida’s own courts have found that “the amount of the bond 
affected the court’s decision in Psychiatric Associates.”  Achord v. 
Osceola Farms Co., 52 So.3d 699, 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding 
a $100 non-resident cost bond statute constitutional). 
 
16 
 
As pointed out above, although the statute provides that the undertaking 
amount can be “fixed by the court,” in practice it is the experience of the 
Attorney General’s Office that an amount greater than $300 is seldom, if 
ever, sought.  
 Kendall’s Petition Clause argument, see Appellant’s Brief at 29, 
also fails because the undertaking has not denied him (or anyone else) 
the right of access to the courts or to petition the government.  
Moreover, the undertaking is rationally related to legitimate state 
interests in discouraging frivolous suits and recouping costs incurred in 
defending against such suits, which is all the Constitution requires.  
See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123 (emphasizing “the general rule” that 
“fee requirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality. . . . [and] 
[t]he State’s need for revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, 
satisfies the rationality requirement.”). 
IV. The Undertaking Statute Does Not Violate Substantive or 
Procedural Due Process. 
 
 The undertaking statute must be upheld so long as “it is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.”  State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 
17 
 
19, 232 P.3d 1008.  As noted above, the requirement serves at least two 
legitimate government interests:  (1) discouraging nuisance suits, and 
(2) ensuring that the government will recoup at least some minimal 
amount of costs should a plaintiff file a frivolous suit anyway. 
 Again, Kendall’s s reliance, but in the context of due process, on  
Psychiatric Associates, Lindsey, and Detraz is misplaced.  See 
Appellant’s Brief at 34-35.  None of those cases deal with the issue of 
protecting public funds by requiring an undertaking for taxable costs in 
suits against a government entity.  They are not applicable here. 
 Kendall’s argument that the undertaking statute does not provide 
any reasonable guidance for a court to determine the appropriate 
amount of an undertaking ignores reality and the law.  Substantive due 
process does not require that every statute detail exactly how any 
tribunal must make a decision applying the statute.  The Utah Supreme 
Court has already addressed this argument in the context of the bond 
statute in Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 1981).  There, the 
Court reasoned: 
 The courts have the means at their command of conducting 
appropriate preliminary procedures to make a determination 
18 
 
on . . . whether the plaintiff is in fact impecunious and unable 
to furnish the bond.  As to the latter, it is significant that the 
statute itself allows some flexibility wherein it provides that 
the bond shall be “in an amount fixed by the court ....”  This 
would permit the court to fix the bond in accordance with the 
plaintiff's circumstances, however impoverished he may be, 
and yet allow him access to the court to seek justice . . . . 
 
Id.  The same reasoning applies to the undertaking statute, which also 
authorizes a “sum fixed by the court.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601(2).  
In fact, the Utah federal district court’s local rule applying to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-7-601 expressly recognizes that “[t]he court may review, fix, 
and adjust the amount of the required undertaking or bond as provided 
by law.”21  In short, courts do not need any more guidance on how to 
appropriately apply the undertaking statute. 
 Kendall cites Utah cases, Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,22 and 
Payne v. Myers,23 as support for his argument that he has a protected 
property right.  See Appellant’s Brief at 40.  But neither case 
addresses nor establishes that a plaintiff even has a protected property 
                                      
 21  Rule DUCivR 67-1(c), quoted in footnote 3 above. 
  
 22  2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663. 
  
 23  743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987). 
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right to sue a governmental entity without complying with the 
undertaking requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.  
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Immunity Act 
to require strict compliance by plaintiffs.  Davis v. Central Utah 
Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT 52, ¶ 40, 147 P.3d 390.  In Davis, the Court 
explained that the “allowance of a claim against [a governmental entity] 
is a statutorily created exception to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.  
Inasmuch as the maintenance of such a cause of action derives from 
such statutory authority, a prerequisite thereto is meeting the 
conditions prescribed in the statute.”  Id. (quotation omitted). 
 Further, although a plaintiff may have a protected property right 
in a vested cause of action, the requirement of filing a $300 (potentially 
refundable) undertaking—to assure that, “if the plaintiff fails to 
prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment,” the “taxable costs 
incurred by the governmental entity in the action” will be paid—does not 
constitute an unconstitutional taking.  The very fact that the 
undertaking is refundable, if the plaintiff prevails or, conversely, is 
properly due for taxable costs, if the plaintiff fails to prosecute or fails to 
20 
 
recover judgment, should make clear that the undertaking requirement 
is not a taking of a vested property right.  
 Kendall relies on a California case, Beaudreau v. Superior Court,24 
to support his takings argument.  See Appellant’s Brief at 41-42.  But 
that case has been roundly criticized25 and its analysis has not been 
widely adopted.  Beaudreau dealt with a statute requiring a cost bond 
in a suit against the Los Angeles Unified School District.  The trial 
court set the bond amount at $20,900.26  On appeal, California’s 
Supreme Court found the bond requirement an unconstitutional taking.  
Beaudreau, 535 P.2d at 724. 
 The California court did not find that the bond violated equal 
protection.  In fact, to the contrary, the court found the bond satisfied 
equal protection standards: 
                                      
 24  535 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1975). 
 
 25  Constitutional Law-Due Process-Statute Requiring Plaintiffs to 
Post Security for Costs Held Violation of Procedural Due Process, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1006, 1008 (1976). 
 
 26  Again, as in essentially all of the cases Kendall cites , the 
amount at issue in Beaudreau was significantly more than Utah’s $300 
undertaking requirement. 
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We do not dispute that the state has a legitimate interest in 
protecting public entities and their employees against frivolous 
lawsuits.  Nor do we necessarily find fault with the statutory 
classification distinguishing between plaintiffs on the basis of 
whether the parties they sue are public entities or public 
employees rather than private persons.  The Legislature may 
have had reason to believe that there exists a greater danger of 
unfounded actions against public, rather than private parties. . . . 
We do not say that the requirement of an undertaking is an 
improper method of effectuating this purpose. 
 
Beaudreau, 535 P.2d at 721 (internal citation omitted). 
 
Instead, the court held that the cost bond constituted a taking 
without adequate due process.  Yet, the California court’s finding that 
the cost of process is a protected property right differs from other 
jurisdictions.  Among the serious criticisms of Beaudreau is that “[t]he 
court’s analysis of the taking issue was unduly superficial” and that the 
court extended due process protection, not only to a person’s interest in a 
cause of action, but to the cost of process in prosecuting that cause of 
action.27 
 But here, the bond can be refunded.  And there is no 
unconstitutional taking.  The undertaking is rationally related to 
                                      
 27  Constitutional Law-Due Process-Statute Requiring Plaintiffs to 
Post Security for Costs Held Violation of Procedural Due Process, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1006, 1008, 110-116 (1976).  
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legitimate state interests in protecting public funds by discouraging 
frivolous suits and recouping costs incurred in defending against such 
suits, which is all the Constitution requires. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601—the longstanding undertaking 
requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act—is permissible 
under, and does not violate either the United States Constitution or the 
Utah Constitution.  
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of June, 2016. 
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